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Abstract
Introducing common sense to natural language
understanding systems has received increasing
research attention. It remains a fundamental
question on how to evaluate whether a system
has a sense making capability. Existing bench-
marks measures commonsense knowledge in-
directly and without explanation. In this pa-
per, we release a benchmark to directly test
whether a system can differentiate natural lan-
guage statements that make sense from those
that do not make sense. In addition, a system is
asked to identify the most crucial reason why
a statement does not make sense. We evalu-
ate models trained over large-scale language
modeling tasks as well as human performance,
showing that there are different challenges for
system sense making.
1 Introduction
Natural Language Understanding (NLU) has re-
ceived increasing research attention in recent
years. With language models trained on large cor-
pora (Peters et al., 2018; Devlin et al., 2018), al-
gorithms show better performance than humans
on some benchmarks (Group, 2017; Devlin et al.,
2018). Compared to humans, however, most end-
to-end trained systems are rather weak on common
sense. For example, it is straightforward for a hu-
man to understand that someone can put a turkey
into a fridge but he can never put an elephant into
a fridge with basic commonsense reasoning, but it
can be non-trivial for a system to tell the differ-
ence. Arguably, commonsense reasoning should
be a central capability in a practical NLU system
(Davis, 2017); it is, therefore, important to be able
to evaluate how well a model can do for sense
making.
Existing datasets test common sense indirectly
through tasks that require extra knowledge, such
Figure 1: Samples of our dataset
as co-reference resolution (Levesque et al., 2012;
Morgenstern and Ortiz, 2015), subsequent event
prediction (Roemmele et al., 2011; Zhang et al.,
2017; Zellers et al., 2018), or reading comprehen-
sion (Mostafazadeh et al., 2016; Ostermann et al.,
2018b). They verify whether a system is equipped
with common sense by testing whether it can give
a correct answer where the input does not contain
such knowledge. However, there are two limita-
tions to such benchmarks. First, they do not give a
direct metric to quantitatively measure sense mak-
ing capability. Second, they do not explicitly iden-
tify the key factors required in a sense making pro-
cess.
We address these issues by creating a testset for
direct sense making. As shown in Figure 1, the
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benchmark consists of two subtasks. The first task
is to choose from two natural language statements
with similar wordings which one makes sense and
which one does not make sense; The second task is
to find the key reason why a given statement does
not make sense. Version 1.0 of our dataset, which
will be released with this paper, contains 2021 in-
stances for each subtask, manually labeled by 7
annotators. Human performance on the bench-
mark is 99.1% for the Sen-Making task and 97.3%
for the Explanation task.
In the Sen-Making task, we use statement pair
classification rather than labelling each statement
‘true’ or ‘false’ in the absolute sense because it is
easy to cite a counterexample for any single ‘true’
or ‘false’ statement. For example, ‘toy elephant’
for ‘he put an elephant into fridge’. But it is ap-
parent that ‘he put a turkey into fridge’ is more
reasonable than ‘he put an elephant into fridge’.
In this pilot study, we evaluate contextualized
representations trained over large-scale language
modeling tasks on our benchmark. Results show
that there is still a large gap behind human per-
formance despite that the models are trained over
100 million natural language sentences. Detailed
examination shows that inference remains a chal-
lenge for such systems. To our knowledge, our
dataset has the most direct decision-making pro-
cess in commonsense reasoning and is the first one
asking reasons behind the decision making pro-
cess.
Note that there has been dataset which fo-
cus on non-linguistic world knowledge plausibil-
ity (Wang et al., 2018) or only limited attributes
or actions of physical knowledge like verbphysics
(Forbes and Choi, 2017). They are related to our
dataset but serve robotic research mainly. Our
dataset is the first benchmark for direct linguis-
tic sense making and explanation. We hope this
benchmark can promote commonsense reason-
ing by the NLP community, and further applied
on other applications such as machine transla-
tion and dialogue. Besides, we also expect that
this work could be instructive on enhancing in-
terpretability on commonsense reasoning research
and other NLP tasks and on combining expla-
nation with language generation. Our dataset is
released at https://github.com/wangcunxiang/Sen-
Making-and-Explanation.
2 Related Work
There has been datasets which focus on non-
linguistic world knowledge validation (Wang
et al., 2018) or only limited attributes or actions
of world knowledge (Forbes and Choi, 2017)
A widely used and important task is the Wino-
grad Schema Challenge (WSC) (Levesque et al.,
2012; Morgenstern and Ortiz, 2015) that needs
more commonsense knowledge. For example,
“The trophy would not fit in the brown suitcase
because it was too big (small). What was too
big (small)?” “Answer 0: the trophy”,“Answer 1:
the suitcase”. However, WSC estimates common
sense indirectly and it does not consider explana-
tion on why one option is true while the other is
wrong.
Choice of Plausible Alternatives (COPA)
(Roemmele et al., 2011) puts emphasis on events
and consequences. Each question of COPA asks
to find the suitable cause or result of the premise
from two given alternatives. All premises and
alternatives are simple sentences. For exam-
ple, “Premise: The man broke his toe. What
was the CAUSE of this?” “1: He got a hole in
his sock.”, “2: He dropped a hammer on his
foot.”. Several subsequent datasets are inspired
by COPA. The JHU Ordinal Common-sense In-
ference (JOCI) (Zhang et al., 2017) aims to label
the plausibility from 5 (very likely) to 1 (impos-
sible) of human response after a certain situation.
Situations with Adversarial Generations (SWAG)
(Zellers et al., 2018) requests to choose the most
likely-to-happen alternative after a specific situ-
ation. Those datasets put emphasis on the pre-
situations and/or the after-situations of certain sit-
uations, but not on the reasons why they occur or
lead.
Some datasets are inspired by reading com-
prehension, providing some textual materials and
questions, asking to find suitable answers from
the provided materials. The Story Cloze Test and
ROCStories Corpora (Mostafazadeh et al., 2016;
Sharma et al., 2018) require to figure out the right
ending from two candidate sentences after a four-
sentence story. For a narrative text, MCScript (Os-
termann et al., 2018a) give various types of ques-
tions and pairs of answer candidates for each ques-
tion. Most questions require knowledge beyond
the facts mentioned in the text. Compared to those
reading comprehension tasks, our benchmark en-
courages people to use any external resources they
want as long as they will help in the task.
Some other datasets are evolved from QA prob-
lems and care more about factual commonsense
knowledge. SQUABU (Davis, 2016) provides
a small hand-constructed test of commonsense
and scientific questions. CommonsenseQA (Tal-
mor et al., 2018) asks crowd workers to create
questions from ConceptNet (Speer et al., 2017),
which is a large knowledge graph of common-
sense knowledge, where each question discrimi-
nates its answer candidates between three target
concepts that all share the same relationship to
a single source drawn from ConceptNet Open-
BookQA (Mihaylov et al., 2018) provides ques-
tions and answer candidates, as well as thousands
of diverse facts about elementary level science that
are related to the questions. The AI2 Reason-
ing Challenge (ARC) (Clark et al., 2018) gives
thousands of questions with different knowledge
types, as well as a relevant 14M-sentence corpus,
mixed with science facts and other narrative sen-
tences. Those questions are not easy to answer
without specializing certain knowledge while our
questions are easy for both adults and children.
In contrast, to our work, the tasks above do not
directly estimate common sense or ask the logical
reasons behind the correct answers and questions.
In recent years, some large-scale common-
sense inference knowledge resources have been
released, which may be helpful in commonsense
reasoning tasks. Atomic (Sap et al., 2018) presents
a huge everyday commonsense reasoning knowl-
edge graph, which has nine if-then relations with
variables, including causes, effects, and so on.
Event2Mind (Rashkin et al., 2018) proposes a
new corpus and task, aiming to find out men-
tioned/unmentioned people’s intents and reactions
under various daily circumstances. These datasets
are not directly useful for our benchmark since
they focus only on a small domain. ConceptNet
is a prestigious knowledge graph that has been up-
graded over a long time (Liu and Singh, 2004;
Havasi et al., 2007; Speer and Havasi, 2013; Speer
et al., 2017). ConceptNet constructs triples us-
ing labeled edges as relations and various words
and/or phrases as entities. It also has the sen-
tences describing the corresponding triples. Thus
we consider using ConceptNet knowledge for fine-
tuning our models.
3 Testset
Task. Formally, each instance in our dataset is
composed of 5 sentences: {s1, s2, r1, r2, r3}. s1
and s2 are two similar sentences which in the same
syntactic structure and differ by only few words,
but only one of them makes sense while the other
does not. They are used on our first subtask called
Sen-Making, which requires the model to identify
which one is valid. For the invalid sentence, we
have three optional reasons r1, r2 and r3 to ex-
plain why the sentence is invalid. Our subtask 2,
named Explanation, requires that the only one cor-
rect reason be identified from two other confusing
ones. We use the accuracy score to evaluate both
subtasks.
Data. For version 1.0 of our dataset, we have
created 2,021 samples. Task 1 has 2,021 against-
common-sense sentences, 2,021 correct sentences;
Task 2 has 2,021 true reasons and 4,042 confusing
reasons. We plan to release a dataset with more
tasks and samples in the future.
Annotation guidelines. When writing samples,
annotators were asked to follow several princi-
ples. First, try to avoid complex knowledge and
focus on daily common sense, and should make
the questions as understandable as possible. Ev-
ery literate person is able to give the right answers.
Second, the confusing reasons should better con-
tain more important words like entities and activ-
ities in the against-common-sense statements, for
example, the confusing reasons of “he put an ele-
phant into the fridge” should better contain both
“elephant” and “fridge”. Third, we want the con-
fusing reasons to be related to the statements and
correct reasons and not deviate from the prob-
lem context, otherwise, it may be easily captured
by BERT (Talmor et al., 2018), which models
the sentence contexts explicitly. Next, the three
option reasons should be only related to the in-
correct sentence rather the correct sentence. Be-
cause we want further studies to be able to es-
timate against-common-sense statements without
those correct statements. Furthermore, the confus-
ing sentences should be correct themselves. Other-
wise, the models may simply ignore the incorrect
options without considering the casual relations
between them. This worry was raised from the fact
that models can achieve high performance in the
ROC Story Cloze Task when only looking at the
alternative endings ignoring the stories (Schwartz
et al., 2017). Last, we control the length of each
Figure 2: Number of ‘Different Words’
sentence, making the incorrect statement nearly as
long as the correct statement, and the right rea-
son neither too long nor too short among the three
reasons. However, those principles are all soft re-
strictions; some samples are still good ones even
without obeying those principles.
Annotation process. We ask data annotators
to write samples by themselves. Then other re-
searchers (the first and second author of this pa-
per) will examine those samples case by case. We
also provide them with external sources to stim-
ulate inspiration, such as the raw English sen-
tences of ConceptNet5.5 (Speer et al., 2017), but
those inspirational sentences should not be used
directly. For example, “he was sent to a (restau-
rant)/(hospital) for treatment after a car crash”
were inspired by the two sentences “restaurants
provide food” and “hospitals provide medical
care” However, those corpus may have incorrect
and one-sided knowledge, we do not use those
sentences. Besides, we also let them get inspira-
tion from existing commonsense reasoning ques-
tions like WSC (Levesque et al., 2012; Morgen-
stern and Ortiz, 2015), COPA (Roemmele et al.,
2011) and SQUABU (Davis, 2016).
Cautions when using the data. 1. Researchers
are encouraged to use what they deemed appro-
priate for the tasks to train their model, and use
our testset for evaluation. 2. Please do not use
the three optional reasons when performing Sen-
Making task, or the task will be artificially easy.
3.1 Corpus Analysis
The average length of two statements in the Sen-
Making task are both 8.26, exactly the same.
The average length of true reasons is 7.63,
slightly smaller than the confusing reasons’ aver-
age length, which is 7.77.
We analyse the different words between cor-
rect statements and incorrect statements, like in
“He put (an elephant)/(a turkey) into the fridge”,
‘an elephant’ is ‘different word’ in incorrect state-
ments and ‘a turkey’ is ‘different word’ in correct
statements. From ‘different words’, we can get an
overview about how correct statements and incor-
rect statements differ from each other.
We select the words which appear more than 9
times in the ‘different words’ and remove stop-
words like ‘a’,‘an’ and ‘the’ to draw Figure 2.
blue lines are the words appear in correct state-
ments but do not appear in incorrect statements,
while orange lines are opposite. We find that in-
correct statements have much the same negative
different words compared with correct statements.
The incorrect statements have 53 ‘don’t’ or ‘can’t’
or ‘not’ or ‘no’ as different words, while the cor-
rect statements have 55. That can illustrate that
the corpus do not use negative words to construct
incorrect statements or correct statements.
4 Experiments
We choose state-of-the-art language models
trained over large texts as our baselines, assuming
that common sense knowledge are encoded over
texts. For the sense making task, we calculate per-
plexities of both statements, choosing the one with
lower scores as the correct one. For explanation,
we first concatenate the statement with the each
reason and then use the three concatenated sen-
tences to calculate perplexities. For example, we
concatenate “he put an elephant into the fridge”
with its optional reasons to be “he put an elephant
into the fridge” is against common sense because
an elephant cannot eat a fridge”.
We also conduct human evaluation on our
dataset. Each sample is answered by at least three
testees. If more than half testees do one sam-
ple wrong (either Sen-Making or Explanation), we
will rewrite or abolish the sample. Otherwise, we
Model Sen-Making Explanation
Random 50.0% 33.3%
ELMo 69.4% 33.4%
BERT 70.1% 45.6%
fine-tuned ELMo 74.1% 34.6%
Human Performance 99.1% 97.8%
Table 1: Experimental Results
will keep it and record it in results.
4.1 Results & Analysis
As shown in Table 1, ELMo and BERT have a
significant advantage over random results in Sen-
Making. We conjure that both of them have the
ability to judge whether a sentence is with or
against common sense. For Sen-Making, ELMo
does better than BERT; However, BERT beats
ELMo in Explanation. ELMo does poorly in
Explanation, much the same as a random guess,
which shows that ELMo cannot handle the casual
relationship between the incorrect statements and
the reasons. In contrast, BERT is significantly bet-
ter than random guess in Explanation. This can
be attributed to BERT’s training on Next Sentence
Prediction (Devlin et al., 2018), which can assist
to handle the logic relationship between two sen-
tences.
Fine-tuned ELMo has an obvious improve-
ment in Sen-Making and a non-obvious improve-
ment in Explanation, probably because introduc-
ing knowledge will help models to identify com-
mon sense but cannot help them in inference.
However, fine-tuning makes BERT perform the
same in Sen-Making and even worse in Explana-
tion. It is likely because the original BERT models
trained on BookCorpus (Zhu et al., 2015) and En-
glish Wikipedia contain sufficient common knowl-
edge and the fine-tune operation may be useless
or even makes the models be specific in the fine-
tuning corpora; Besides, fine-tuning may corrupt
the structure formed by Next Sentence Prediction.
How to overcome the weaknesses of fine-tuning
operation may be an interesting topic in represen-
tation learning.
The method of fine-tuning can be viewed as a
way to make use of human labelled knowledge
base for common sense, however, a thorough in-
vestigation along this direction takes significant
research effort, which is beyond the scope of this
paper. It is also important to note that human
labelled commonsense knowledge bases are in-
evitably limited by the scope. Therefore, glean-
ing knowledge from large raw text is still a more
promising direction.
Note also that unlike reading comprehension
tasks (Rajpurkar et al., 2016), where machines
can surpass human performance by careful fine-
tuning, it remains a big challenge for systems to
reach human performance, which is near 100% for
sense making. When the human testee is asked to
look at the mistakes that they make, we find that
most human errors are due to reduced concentra-
tion rather than conceptual issues.
4.2 Case Study
We find an interesting case illustrating that fine-
tuning operation can help model identify common
sense but cannot help much in inference. The ex-
ample is “New York is located in the northeastern
part of USA” vs “the USA is located in the north-
eastern part of New York”. The original ELMo
is incorrect in both Sen-Making and Explanation.
After fine-tuning with a corpora which contains
that “New York is a city” and “the USA is a coun-
try”, the ELMo can figure out the incorrect sen-
tence but still cannot pick out the correct reason.
We find that LM-based techniques cannot han-
dle commonsense Sen-Making problems which
need inference, such as the case “I’m too full for
lunch, so I’m going (for a walk)/(to eat more).”
and its explanation, no matter fine-tuned or not.
This is likely because it remains difficult for
LSTM language models for making multi-step in-
ference.
5 Conclusion
We created a benchmark for directly evaluating
whether a system has the capability of sense mak-
ing and explanation, evaluating models trained
over the large raw text as well as a common sense
database on the test set. Results show that sense
making remains a technical challenge for such
models, whereas inference is a key factor that is
missing.
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